A. Introduction

1. Title: Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements
2. Number: MH-TPL-001-4
3. Purpose: Establish Transmission system planning performance requirements within the planning horizon to develop Manitoba’s portion of the Bulk Electric System (BES) that will operate reliably over a broad spectrum of System conditions and following a wide range of probable Contingencies.
4. Applicability:
   4.1. Functional Entity
      4.1.1. Planning Coordinator.
5. Effective Date: MH-TPL-001-4 shall become effective in Manitoba on July 1, 2017.
6. Interpretation: The capitalized terms in MH-TPL-001-4 shall have the meaning set forth in the “Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards” effective July 1, 2017.
B. Requirements

R1. The Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator) shall maintain System models for its respective area for performing the studies needed to complete its Planning Assessment. The models shall use data consistent with that provided in accordance with the applicable NERC MOD Reliability Standard(s), supplemented by other sources as needed, including items represented in an applicable Corrective Action Plan, and shall represent projected System conditions. This establishes Category P0 as the normal System condition in Table 1.

1.1. System models shall represent:

1.1.1. Existing Facilities

1.1.2. Known outage(s) of generation or Transmission Facility(ies) with a duration of at least six months.

1.1.3. New planned Facilities and changes to existing Facilities

1.1.4. Real and reactive Load forecasts

1.1.5. Known commitments for Firm Transmission Service and Interchange

1.1.6. Resources (supply or demand side) required for Load

R2. The Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator) shall prepare an annual Planning Assessment of its portion of the BES. This Planning Assessment shall use current or qualified past studies (as defined in Requirement R2, Part 2.6), document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analyses, short circuit analyses, and Stability analyses.

2.1. For the Planning Assessment, the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon portion of the steady state analysis shall be assessed annually and be supported by current annual studies or qualified past studies as indicated in Requirement R2, Part 2.6. Qualifying studies need to include the following conditions:

2.1.1. System peak Load for either Year One or year two, and for year five.

2.1.2. System Off-Peak Load for one of the five years.

2.1.3. P1 events in Table 1, with known outages modeled as in Requirement R1, Part 1.1.2, under those System peak or Off-Peak conditions when known outages are scheduled.

2.1.4. For each of the studies described in Requirement R2, Parts 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, sensitivity case(s) shall be utilized to demonstrate the impact of changes to the basic assumptions used in the model. To accomplish this, the sensitivity analysis in the Planning Assessment must vary one or more of the following conditions by a sufficient amount to stress the System within a range of credible conditions that demonstrate a measurable change in System response:

- Real and reactive forecasted Load,
- Expected transfers,
- Expected in service dates of new or modified Transmission Facilities,
- Reactive resource capability,
- Generation additions, retirements, or other dispatch scenarios.
• Controllable Loads and Demand Side Management.
• Duration or timing of known Transmission outages.

2.1.5. When Manitoba Hydro’s spare equipment strategy could result in the unavailability of major Transmission equipment that has a lead time of one year or more (such as a transformer), the impact of this possible unavailability on System performance shall be studied. The studies shall be performed for the P0, P1, and P2 categories identified in Table 1 with the conditions that the System is expected to experience during the possible unavailability of the long lead time equipment.

2.2. For the Planning Assessment, the Long-Term Transmission Planning Horizon portion of the steady state analysis shall be assessed annually and be supported by the following annual current study, supplemented with qualified past studies as indicated in Requirement R2, Part 2.6:

2.2.1. A current study assessing expected System peak Load conditions for one of the years in the Long-Term Transmission Planning Horizon and the rationale for why that year was selected.

2.3. The short circuit analysis portion of the Planning Assessment shall be conducted annually addressing the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon and can be supported by current or past studies as qualified in Requirement R2, Part 2.6. The analysis shall be used to determine whether circuit breakers have interrupting capability for Faults that they will be expected to interrupt using the System short circuit model with any planned generation and Transmission Facilities in service which could impact the study area.

2.4. For the Planning Assessment, the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon portion of the Stability analysis shall be assessed annually and be supported by current or past studies as qualified in Requirement R2, Part 2.6. The following studies are required:

2.4.1. System peak Load for one season of the five years that is expected to produce more severe System impacts. System peak Load levels shall include a Load model which represents the expected dynamic behavior of Loads that could impact the study area, considering the behavior of induction motor Loads. An aggregate System Load model which represents the overall dynamic behavior of the Load is acceptable.

2.4.2. System Off-Peak Load for one of the five years.

2.4.3. For each of the studies described in Requirement R2, Parts 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, sensitivity case(s) shall be utilized to demonstrate the impact of changes to the basic assumptions used in the model. To accomplish this, the sensitivity analysis in the Planning Assessment must vary one or more of the following conditions by a sufficient amount to stress the System within a range of credible conditions that demonstrate a measurable change in performance:

• Load level, Load forecast, or dynamic Load model assumptions.
• Expected transfers.
• Expected in service dates of new or modified Transmission Facilities.
• Reactive resource capability.
• Generation additions, retirements, or other dispatch scenarios.
2.5. For the Planning Assessment, the Long-Term Transmission Planning Horizon portion of the Stability analysis shall be assessed to address the impact of proposed material generation additions or changes in that timeframe and be supported by current or past studies as qualified in Requirement R2, Part 2.6 and shall include documentation to support the technical rationale for determining material changes.

2.6. Past studies may be used to support the Planning Assessment if they meet the following requirements:

2.6.1. For steady state, short circuit, or Stability analysis: the study shall be five calendar years old or less, unless a technical rationale can be provided to demonstrate that the results of an older study are still valid.

2.6.2. For steady state, short circuit, or Stability analysis: no material changes have occurred to the System represented in the study. Documentation to support the technical rationale for determining material changes shall be included.

2.7. For planning events shown in Table 1, when the analysis indicates an inability of the System to meet the performance requirements in Table 1, the Planning Assessment shall include the development of an applicable Corrective Action Plan to address the inability of the System to meet the performance requirements. Prior to the implementation of any element of a Corrective Action Plan developed in accordance with this Requirement all applicable corporate, regulatory, provincial, and federal evaluations and approvals must be completed and obtained. During the time period prior to such implementation of an applicable Corrective Action Plan, the Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator) is permitted to utilize Non-Consequential Load Loss and Curtailment of Firm Transmission Service to correct the situation, notwithstanding the performance requirements in Table 1. Revisions to the Corrective Action Plan are allowed in subsequent Planning Assessments but the planned System shall continue to meet the performance requirements in Table 1. A Corrective Action Plan does not need to be developed solely to meet the performance requirements for a single sensitivity case analyzed in accordance with Requirements R2, Parts 2.1.4 and 2.4.3. The applicable timeline for implementation of a Corrective Action Plan shall be determined by the Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator). The Corrective Action Plan shall:

2.7.1. List System deficiencies and the associated actions needed to achieve required System performance. Examples of such actions include but are not limited to:

- Installation, modification, retirement, or removal of Transmission and generation Facilities and any associated equipment.
- Installation, modification, or removal of Protection Systems or Special Protection Systems
- Installation or modification of automatic generation tripping as a response to a single or multiple Contingency to mitigate Stability performance violations.
- Installation or modification of manual and automatic generation runback/tripping as a response to a single or multiple Contingency to mitigate steady state performance violations.
- Use of Operating Procedures specifying how long they will be needed as part of the Corrective Action Plan.
- Use of rate applications, demand-side management, new technologies, or other initiatives.
- Use of additional overload capability for multiple Contingency events considering pre-contingency line loading.
2.7.2 Include actions to resolve performance deficiencies identified in multiple sensitivity studies in an economically and technically efficient manner or provide a rationale for why actions were not necessary.

2.7.3 Be reviewed in subsequent annual Planning Assessments for continued validity and implementation status of identified System Facilities and Operating Procedures.

2.8 For short circuit analysis, if the short circuit current interrupting duty on circuit breakers determined in Requirement R2, Part 2.3 exceeds their Equipment Rating, the Planning Assessment shall include a Corrective Action Plan to address the Equipment Rating violations. Prior to the implementation of a Corrective Action Plan developed in accordance with this Requirement all applicable corporate, regulatory, provincial, and federal evaluations and approvals must be completed and obtained. The applicable timeline for implementation of a Corrective Action Plan shall be determined by the Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator). The Corrective Action Plan shall:

2.8.1 List System deficiencies and the associated actions needed to achieve required System performance. Examples of such actions include but are not limited to:
   • Installation, modification, retirement, or removal of Transmission and generation Facilities and any associated equipment.
   • Use of Operating Procedures specifying how long they will be needed as part of the Corrective Action Plan.
   • Use of new technologies or other initiatives.

2.8.1 Be reviewed in subsequent annual Planning Assessments for continued validity and implementation status of identified System Facilities and Operating Procedures.

R3. For the steady state portion of the Planning Assessment, the Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator) shall perform studies for the Near-Term and Long-Term Transmission Planning Horizons in Requirement R2, Parts 2.1, and 2.2. The studies shall be based on computer simulation models using data provided in Requirement R1.

3.1. Studies shall be performed for planning events to determine whether its portion of the BES meet the performance requirements in Table 1 based on the Contingency list created in Requirement R3, Part 3.4.

3.2. Studies shall be performed to assess the impact of the extreme events which are identified by the list created in Requirement R3, Part 3.5.

3.3. Contingency analyses for Requirement R3, Parts 3.1 and 3.2 shall:

3.3.1. Simulate the removal of all elements that the Protection System and other automatic controls are expected to disconnect for each Contingency without operator intervention. The analyses shall include the impact of subsequent:

3.3.1.1. Tripping of generators where simulations show generator bus voltages or high side of the generation step up (GSU) voltages are less than known or assumed minimum generator steady state or ride through voltage limitations. Include in the assessment any assumptions made.

3.3.1.2. Tripping of Transmission elements where relay loadability limits are exceeded.

3.3.2. Simulate the expected automatic operation of existing and planned devices designed to provide steady state control of electrical system quantities when such devices impact the study area. These devices may include equipment such as phase-shifting transformers, load tap changing transformers, and
3.4. Those planning events in Table 1, that are expected to produce more severe System impacts on its portion of the BES, shall be identified and a list of those Contingencies to be evaluated for System performance in Requirement R3, Part 3.1 created. The rationale for those Contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information.

3.4.1. The Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator) shall coordinate with adjacent Planning Coordinators (IESO, SPC and MISO) to ensure that Contingencies on adjacent Systems which may impact their Systems are included in the Contingency list.

3.5. Those extreme events in Table 1 that are expected to produce more severe System impacts shall be identified and a list created of those events to be evaluated in Requirement R3, Part 3.2. The rationale for those Contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. If the analysis concludes there is Cascading caused by the occurrence of extreme events, an evaluation of possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences and adverse impacts of the event(s) shall be conducted.

R4. For the Stability portion of the Planning Assessment, as described in Requirement R2, Parts 2.4 and 2.5, the Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator) shall perform the Contingency analyses listed in Table 1. The studies shall be based on computer simulation models using data provided in Requirement R1.

4.1. Studies shall be performed for planning events to determine whether its portion of the BES meet the performance requirements in Table 1 based on the Contingency list created in Requirement R4, Part 4.4.

4.1.1. For planning event P1: No generating unit shall pull out of synchronism. A generator being disconnected from the System by fault clearing action or by a Special Protection System is not considered pulling out of synchronism.

4.1.2. For planning events P2 through P7: When a generator pulls out of synchronism in the simulations, the resulting apparent impedance swings shall not result in the tripping of any Transmission system elements other than the generating unit and its directly connected Facilities.

4.1.3. For planning events P1 through P7: Power oscillations shall exhibit acceptable damping as established by the Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator).

4.2. Studies shall be performed to assess the impact of the extreme events which are identified by the list created in Requirement R4, Part 4.5.

4.3. Contingency analyses for Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 and 4.2 shall:

4.3.1. Simulate the removal of all elements that the Protection System and other automatic controls are expected to disconnect for each Contingency without operator intervention. The analyses shall include the impact of subsequent:

4.3.1.1. Successful high speed (less than one second) reclosing and unsuccessful high speed reclosing into a Fault where high speed reclosing is utilized.

4.3.1.2. Tripping of generators where simulations show generator bus voltages or high side of the GSU voltages are less than known or assumed generator low voltage ride through capability. Include in the assessment any assumptions made.

4.3.1.3. Tripping of Transmission lines and transformers where transient swings cause Protection System operation based on generic or
4.3.2. Simulate the expected automatic operation of existing and planned devices designed to provide dynamic control of electrical system quantities when such devices impact the study area. These devices may include equipment such as generation exciter control and power system stabilizers, static var compensators, power flow controllers, and DC Transmission controllers.

4.4. Those planning events in Table 1 that are expected to produce more severe System impacts on its portion of the BES shall be identified, and a list created of those Contingencies to be evaluated in Requirement R4, Part 4.1. The rationale for those Contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information.

4.4.1. The Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator) shall coordinate with adjacent Planning Coordinators (IESO, SPC and MISO) to ensure that Contingencies on adjacent Systems which may impact their Systems are included in the Contingency list.

4.5. Those extreme events in Table 1 that are expected to produce more severe System impacts shall be identified and a list created of those events to be evaluated in Requirement R4, Part 4.2. The rationale for those Contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information. If the analysis concludes there is Cascading caused by the occurrence of extreme events, an evaluation of possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences of the event(s) shall be conducted.

R5. The Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator) shall have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage limits, post-Contingency voltage deviations, and the transient voltage response for its System. For transient voltage response, the criteria shall at a minimum, specify a low voltage level and a maximum length of time that transient voltages may remain below that level.

R6. The Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator) shall define and document, within their Planning Assessment, the criteria or methodology used in the analysis to identify System instability for conditions such as Cascading, voltage instability, or uncontrolled islanding.

R7. Not Applicable in Manitoba

R8. The Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator) shall distribute its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators (IESO, SPC and MISO) within 90 calendar days of completing its Planning Assessment, and to any functional entity that has a reliability related need and submits a written request for the information within 30 calendar days of such a request.

8.1. If a recipient of the Planning Assessment results provides documented comments on the results, the Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator) shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
Table 1 – Steady State & Stability Performance Planning Events

**Steady State & Stability:**

a. The System shall remain stable. Cascading and uncontrolled islanding shall not occur.
b. Consequential Load Loss as well as generation loss is acceptable as a consequence of any event excluding P0.
c. Simulate the removal of all elements that Protection Systems and other controls are expected to automatically disconnect for each event.
d. Simulate Normal Clearing unless otherwise specified.
e. Planned System adjustments such as Transmission configuration changes and re-dispatch of generation are allowed if such adjustments are executable within the time duration applicable to the Facility Ratings.

**Steady State Only:**

f. Applicable Facility Ratings shall not be exceeded.
g. System steady state voltages and post-Contingency voltage deviations shall be within acceptable limits as established by the Planning Coordinator and the Transmission Planner.
h. Planning event P0 is applicable to steady state only.
i. The response of voltage sensitive Load that is disconnected from the System by end-user equipment associated with an event shall not be used to meet steady state performance requirements.

**Stability Only:**

j. Transient voltage response shall be within acceptable limits established by the Planning Coordinator and the Transmission Planner.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Initial Condition</th>
<th>Event 1</th>
<th>Fault Type 2</th>
<th>BES Level 3</th>
<th>Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed 4</th>
<th>Non-Consequential Load Loss Allowed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P0</td>
<td>Normal System</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>EHV, HV</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>Normal System</td>
<td>Loss of one of the following: 1. Generator 2. Transmission circuit 3. Transformer 5 4. Shunt device 6</td>
<td>3Ø</td>
<td>EHV, HV</td>
<td>No⁹</td>
<td>No¹²</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>5. Single Pole of a DC line</td>
<td>SLG</td>
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<td>P2</td>
<td>Normal System</td>
<td>1. Opening of a line section w/o a fault 7</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>EHV, HV</td>
<td>No⁹</td>
<td>No¹²</td>
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<td>2. Bus section Fault</td>
<td>SLG</td>
<td>EHV</td>
<td>No⁹</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>3. Internal breaker Fault 8 (non-Bus-tie Breaker)</td>
<td>SLG</td>
<td>HV</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>4. Internal Breaker Fault (Bus-tie Breaker) 8</td>
<td>SLG</td>
<td>EHV, HV</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Initial Condition</td>
<td>Event 1</td>
<td>Fault Type 2</td>
<td>BES Level 3</td>
<td>Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed</td>
<td>Non-Consequential Load Loss Allowed</td>
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<tr>
<td>P3 Multiple Contingency</td>
<td>Loss of generator unit followed by System adjustments†</td>
<td>Loss of one of the following:</td>
<td>3Ø</td>
<td>EHV, HV</td>
<td>No⁹</td>
<td>No¹²</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Generator</td>
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<td>2. Transmission circuit</td>
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<td>3. Transformer ⁵</td>
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<td>4. Shunt device ⁶</td>
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<td>5. Single pole of a DC line</td>
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<tr>
<td>P4 Multiple Contingency</td>
<td>Normal System</td>
<td>Loss of multiple elements caused by a stuck breaker ¹⁰(non-Bus-tie Breaker) attempting to clear a Fault on one of the following:</td>
<td>SLG</td>
<td>EHV</td>
<td>No⁹</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>(Fault plus stuck breaker¹⁰)</td>
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<td>1. Generator</td>
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<td>2. Transmission circuit</td>
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<td>3. Transformer ⁵</td>
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<td>4. Shunt device ⁶</td>
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<td>5. Bus section</td>
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<td>6. Loss of multiple elements caused by a stuck breaker ¹⁰ (Bus-tie Breaker) attempting to clear a Fault on the associated bus</td>
<td>SLG</td>
<td>EHV, HV</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>P5 Multiple Contingency</td>
<td>Normal System</td>
<td>Delayed Fault Clearing due to the failure of a non-redundant relay¹² protecting the Faulted element to operate as designed, for one of the following:</td>
<td>SLG</td>
<td>EHV</td>
<td>No⁹</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>(Fault plus relay failure to operate)</td>
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<td>1. Generator</td>
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<td>2. Transmission circuit</td>
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<td>3. Transformer ⁵</td>
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<td>4. Shunt device ⁶</td>
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<td>5. Bus section</td>
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<td>P6 Multiple Contingency</td>
<td>Loss of one of the following followed by System adjustments.†</td>
<td>Loss of one of the following:</td>
<td>3Ø</td>
<td>EHV, HV</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Two overlapping singles)</td>
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<td>1. Transmission Circuit</td>
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<td>2. Transformer ⁵</td>
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<td>3. Shunt device ⁶</td>
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<td>4. Single pole of a DC line</td>
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<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Initial Condition</td>
<td>Event ¹</td>
<td>Fault Type ²</td>
<td>BES Level ³</td>
<td>Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed ⁴</td>
<td>Non-Consequential Load Loss Allowed</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| P7 Multiple Contingency (Common Structure) | Normal System     | The loss of: 1. Any two adjacent (vertically or horizontally) circuits on common structure ¹¹  
2. Loss of a bipolar DC line | SLG           | EHV, HV                 | Yes                                             | Yes                                |

¹ Event description: The loss of: 1. Any two adjacent (vertically or horizontally) circuits on common structure ¹¹  
2. Loss of a bipolar DC line
Table 1 – Steady State & Stability Performance Extreme Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steady State &amp; Stability</th>
<th>Stability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>For all extreme events evaluated:</strong></td>
<td><strong>With an initial condition of a single generator, Transmission circuit, single pole of a DC line, shunt device, or transformer forced out of service:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Simulate the removal of all elements that Protection Systems and automatic controls are expected to disconnect for each Contingency.</td>
<td><strong>single pole of a DC line, shunt device, or transformer forced out of service followed by another single generator, Transmission circuit, single pole of a different DC Line, shunt device, or transformer forced out of service prior to System adjustments.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Simulate Normal Clearing unless otherwise specified.</td>
<td><strong>Local or wide area events affecting the Transmission System such as:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Steady State</strong></td>
<td><strong>Steady State</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Loss of a single generator, Transmission circuit, single pole of a DC Line, shunt device, or transformer forced out of service followed by another single generator, Transmission circuit, single pole of a different DC Line, shunt device, or transformer forced out of service prior to System adjustments.</td>
<td>a. <strong>3Ø fault on generator with stuck breaker</strong> or a relay failure result in <strong>Delayed Fault Clearing.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Local area events affecting the Transmission System such as:</td>
<td>b. <strong>3Ø fault on Transmission circuit with stuck breaker</strong> or a relay failure result in <strong>Delayed Fault Clearing.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Loss of a tower line with three or more circuits.</td>
<td>c. <strong>3Ø fault on transformer with stuck breaker</strong> or a relay failure result in <strong>Delayed Fault Clearing.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Loss of all Transmission lines on a common Right-of-Way.</td>
<td>d. <strong>3Ø fault on bus section with stuck breaker</strong> or a relay failure result in <strong>Delayed Fault Clearing.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Loss of a switching station or substation (loss of one voltage level plus transformers).</td>
<td>e. <strong>3Ø internal breaker fault.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Loss of all generating units at a generating station.</td>
<td>f. Other events based upon operating experience, such as consideration of initiating events that experience suggests may result in wide area disturbances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Loss of a large Load or major Load center.</td>
<td><strong>Wide area events affecting the Transmission System based on System topology such as:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Wide area events affecting the Transmission System based on System topology such as:</td>
<td><strong>3Ø internal breaker fault.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Loss of two generating stations resulting from conditions such as:</td>
<td>f. Other events based upon operating experience, such as consideration of initiating events that experience suggests may result in wide area disturbances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Loss of a large gas pipeline into a region or multiple regions that have significant gas-fired generation.</td>
<td><strong>Stability</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. Loss of the use of a large body of water as the cooling source for generation.</td>
<td>a. <strong>3Ø fault on generator with stuck breaker</strong> or a relay failure result in <strong>Delayed Fault Clearing.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. Wildfires.</td>
<td>b. <strong>3Ø fault on Transmission circuit with stuck breaker</strong> or a relay failure result in <strong>Delayed Fault Clearing.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv. Severe weather, e.g., hurricanes, tornadoes, etc.</td>
<td>c. <strong>3Ø fault on transformer with stuck breaker</strong> or a relay failure result in <strong>Delayed Fault Clearing.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v. A successful cyber attack.</td>
<td>d. <strong>3Ø fault on bus section with stuck breaker</strong> or a relay failure result in <strong>Delayed Fault Clearing.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi. Shutdown of a nuclear power plant(s) and related facilities for a day or more for common causes such as problems with similarly designed plants.</td>
<td>e. <strong>3Ø internal breaker fault.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Other events based upon operating experience that may result in wide area disturbances.</td>
<td>f. Other events based upon operating experience, such as consideration of initiating events that experience suggests may result in wide area disturbances.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 – Steady State & Stability Performance Footnotes
(Planning Events and Extreme Events)

1. If the event analyzed involves elements of the BES at multiple System voltage levels, the lowest System voltage level of the element(s) removed for the analyzed event determines the stated performance criteria regarding allowances for interruptions of Firm Transmission Service and Non-Consequential Load Loss.

2. Unless specified otherwise, simulate Normal Clearing of faults. Single line to ground (SLG) or three-phase (3Ø) are the fault types that must be evaluated in Stability simulations for the event described. A 3Ø or a double line to ground fault study indicating the criteria are being met is sufficient evidence that a SLG condition would also meet the criteria.

3. Bulk Electric System BES level references include extra-high voltage (EHV) Facilities defined as greater than 300kV and high voltage (HV) Facilities defined as the 300kV and lower voltage Systems. The designation of EHV and HV is used to distinguish between stated performance criteria allowances for interruption of Firm Transmission Service and Non-Consequential Load Loss.

4. Curtailment of Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Service with conditions pursuant to Section 13.5 of the Manitoba Hydro Open Access Transmission Tariff is allowed.

5. For non-generator step up transformer outage events, the reference voltage, as used in footnote 1, applies to the low-side winding (excluding tertiary windings). For generator and Generator Step Up transformer outage events, the reference voltage applies to the BES connected voltage (high-side of the Generator Step Up transformer). Requirements which are applicable to transformers also apply to variable frequency transformers and phase shifting transformers.

6. Requirements which are applicable to shunt devices also apply to FACTS devices that are connected to ground.

7. Opening one end of a line section without a fault on a normally networked Transmission circuit such that the line is possibly serving Load radial from a single source point.

8. An internal breaker fault means a breaker failing internally, thus creating a System fault which must be cleared by protection on both sides of the breaker.

9. An objective of the planning process should be to minimize the likelihood and magnitude of interruption of Firm Transmission Service following Contingency events. Curtailment of Firm Transmission Service is allowed both as a System adjustment (as identified in the column entitled ‘Initial Condition’) and a corrective action when achieved through the appropriate re-dispatch of resources obligated to re-dispatch (eg. generator contingency reserves identified in a reserve sharing agreement), where it can be demonstrated that Facilities internal and external to the Transmission Planner’s planning region, remain within applicable Facility Ratings and the re-dispatch does not result in any Non-Consequential Load Loss. Where limited options for re-dispatch exist, sensitivities associated with the availability of those resources should be considered.

10. A stuck breaker means that for a gang-operated breaker, all three phases of the breaker have remained closed. For an independent pole operated or an independent pole tripping breaker, only one pole is assumed to remain closed. A stuck breaker results in Delayed Fault Clearing.

11. Excludes circuits that share a common structure (Planning event P7, Extreme event steady state 2a) or common Right-of-Way (Extreme event, steady state 2b) for 2 kilometers or less.

12. An objective of the planning process is to minimize the likelihood and magnitude of Non-Consequential Load Loss following planning events. Non-Consequential Load Loss may be needed throughout the planning horizon to ensure that performance requirements noted in this Table are met.

13. Applies to the following relay functions or types: pilot (#85), distance (#21), differential (#87), current (#50, 51, and 67), voltage (#27 & 59), directional (#32, & 67), and tripping (#86, & 94).
Attachment 1

NOT APPLICABLE IN MANITOBA
C. Measures

M1. The Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator) shall provide evidence, in electronic or hard copy format, that it is maintaining System models within their respective area, using data consistent with the applicable NERC MOD Reliability Standard(s), including items represented in an applicable Corrective Action Plan, representing projected System conditions, and that the models represent the required information in accordance with Requirement R1.

M2. The Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator) shall provide dated evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of its annual Planning Assessment, that it has prepared an annual Planning Assessment of its portion of the BES in accordance with Requirement R2.

M3. The Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator) shall provide dated evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of the studies utilized in preparing the Planning Assessment, in accordance with Requirement R3.

M4. The Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator) shall provide dated evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of the studies utilized in preparing the Planning Assessment in accordance with Requirement R4.

M5. The Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator) shall provide dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of the documentation specifying the criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage limits, post-Contingency voltage deviations, and the transient voltage response for its System in accordance with Requirement R5.

M6. The Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator) shall provide dated evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of the documentation specifying the criteria or methodology used in the analysis to identify System instability for conditions such as Cascading, voltage instability, or uncontrolled islanding that was utilized in preparing the Planning Assessment in accordance with Requirement R6.

M7. Not Applicable in Manitoba.

M8. The Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator) shall provide evidence, such as email notices, documentation of updated web pages, postal receipts showing recipient and date; or a demonstration of a public posting, that it has distributed its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators within 90 calendar days of having completed its Planning Assessment, and to any functional entity who has indicated a reliability need within 30 calendar days of a written request and that the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner has provided a documented response to comments received on Planning Assessment results within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R8.

D. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

   1.1 Compliance Enforcement Authority

      Not applicable.

   1.2 Compliance Monitoring Period and Reset Timeframe

      Not applicable.

   1.3 Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Processes:

      Compliance Audits
      Self-Certifications
      Spot Checking
1.4 **Data Retention**

The Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator) shall retain data or evidence to show compliance as identified:

- The models utilized in the current in-force Planning Assessment and one previous Planning Assessment in accordance with Requirement R1 and Measure M1.

- The Planning Assessments performed since the last compliance audit in accordance with Requirement R2 and Measure M2.

- The studies performed in support of its Planning Assessments since the last compliance audit in accordance with Requirement R3 and Measure M3.

- The studies performed in support of its Planning Assessments since the last compliance audit in accordance with Requirement R4 and Measure M4.

- The documentation specifying the criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage limits, post-Contingency voltage deviations, and transient voltage response since the last compliance audit in accordance with Requirement R5 and Measure M5.

- The documentation specifying the criteria or methodology utilized in the analysis to identify System instability for conditions such as Cascading, voltage instability, or uncontrolled islanding in support of its Planning Assessments since the last compliance audit in accordance with Requirement R6 and Measure M6.

The Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator) shall retain data or evidence to show compliance as identified:

- Three calendar years of the notifications employed in accordance with Requirement R8 and Measure M8.

If the Manitoba Hydro (Planning Coordinator) is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until found compliant or the time periods specified above, whichever is longer.

1.5 **Additional Compliance Information**

None

E. **Regional Variances**

None.

**Version History**

None.